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THE GROWTH OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
THO MAS J.

SCHOENBAUM*

Created by treaty1 in 1957, the European Economic Community has
long been recognized as more than an international organization. To
distinguish it from international bodies such as the Council of Europe,
the United Nations, and the European Free Trade Association, the
European Economic Community (hereinafter EEC) has been described
as "supranational." 2 This term was coined to emphasize the power of
certain institutions of the EEC to issue decisions binding on governments
and even to issue decisions directly binding on individuals and enterprises
without the intervention of governments.'
Three of the principal institutions of the EEC-the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the Court of Justice-possess some measure
of supranational power.4 In fact, one of the most remarkable developments in recent EEC history has been the Court of Justice's assertion of
its supranational power. Eric Stein, in commenting upon a 1964
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
The writer expresses his gratitude to Professor Eric Stein of the University of
Michigan Law School and to Professor Frank R. Strong of the University of
North Carolina School of Law for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2 Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, 91 RECUEIL DES COURS
105, 143-48 (1957).
'Legal scholars disagree as to the precise meaning of supranational. Robertson,
supra note 2, feels that defining supranational in terms of the power to render decisions that are binding on governments is not useful or adequate because other
international organizations that are not supranational, such as the Security Council
of the United Nations and the International Cotrt of Justice, have this power.
Supranational, in his view, is better defined as the power to render decisions that
are directly binding on individuals without the intervention of governments.
Thompson, on the other hand, would consider both concepts to be essential to the
definition of supranationality. Thompson, The Common Market: A New Legal
Order, 41 WASH. L. REv. 385, 3,86 (1966).
'Thompson, supra note 3, at 386. See also Houben, The Merger of the Executives of the European Communities, 3 Comm. MXT. L. REv. 37 (1965); Overstreet,
The Nature and Prospects of European Institutions, 3 J. COMM. MKT. STUDIES
124, 147-48 (1965); Stein, The New Institutions, in 1 E. STEIN & T. NcIrioLSON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL
PROFILE 33-51 (1960).
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decision of the Court, made the perceptive observation that the Court
was dealing with the EEC Treaty "as if it were a constitution rather
than a treaty.... -"
One can indeed view the recent history of the Court of Justice as
involving quasi-constitutional crises strikingly similar to those faced by
the Supreme Court of the United States in its early history. It is the
writer's aim in this article to suggest that the growth of judicial power
in the EEC has paralleled in many respects the early growth of the
judicial power of the federal government of the United States and to
suggest ways to further expand the judicial power of the EEC.6
I.

ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

As the judicial arm of the EEC, the Court of Justice has the important task of assuring that Community law is implemented and uniformly interpreted in the member states. This task is the duty of the
judicial branch in any federal system. Since a federal relationship does
exist between the Community legal system and the legal systems of the
member states,' three principles must be firmly established in order for
the Community legal order to operate effectively: (1) that the Community treaty and regulations give rise to rights that individuals can enforce in national courts; (2) that a right derived from the Community
legal order is superior to a prior or even a subsequent national law; and
(3) that the Community legal order will be given effect in the legal systems
of the member states.' While these principles have been firmly established in the federal system of the United States by express provisions
I Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the
Margin of the Costa Case, 63 MIcH. L. R.v. 491, 513 (1965) [hereinafter cited

as Stein]. The case commented on was Costa v. E.N.E.L., 10 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 1143 (Cour de Justice des Communautis europ~ennes 1964).
'This discussion will be limited to a consideration of those aspects of the

growth of EEC judicial power evidenced by decisions of the Court of Justice and
will not attempt to deal with the recently signed Convention Relating to the
Jurisdiction of Courts and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Criminal
Matters. Although this Convention has potential constitutional significance, it will

not function as does the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution

until the Court of Justice is given the role as final arbiter of the Convention's

provisions. See Hay, The Common Market PreliminaryDraft Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements-Some Considerationsof Policy and
Interpretation, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1968); Nadelmarn, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgements: The Common Market
Draft, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 995 (1967).
" Hay, Supremacy of Community Law in National Courts, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L.
524, 543 (1968).
'These principles were first formulated by Stein, supra note 5, at 502-03.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

in the United States Constitution, by legislative action, and by judicial
decision, they are still in the process of being fashioned in the EEC with
the Court of Justice taking an active part in their development.

n. THE

FIRST ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE:

THE SELF-EXECUTING CHARACTER OF COMMUNITY LAW

A. The American Parallel
No union of states can take on federal dimensions unless the legal
order thereby created operates directly on individuals without the need
for supplementary action by the member states of the union. In 1787,
Alexander Hamilton wrote that the "great and radical vice" in the
confederation of the thirteen colonies was that its principal function
was to legislate "for states and governments in their corporate and
collective capacities" and not for the "individuals of whom they consist."9 The colonies, he argued, needed to join together in a stronger
union having power to operate directly on individual citizens. With the
adoption of the Constitution, the colonies created such a union.
This principle was not accepted without controversy and dissent. In
1788, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution on the grounds that the
national government created thereby was to operate directly on the people
and not merely upon the states.10 St. George Tucker, on the other hand,
believed that the Constitution merely established an alliance between
independent, sovereign states." This latter view of the Constitution was
argued to one of the justices of the Supreme Court in Elkison v. Deliesseline,.2 which involved the constitutionality of a South Carolina law
ed. 1961) (A Hamilton).
No. 15, at 93-95 (J. Cooke
*THE FEDERALIST
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 54
"°3 DEBATES OF THE
(J. Elliot ed. 1836). Henry demanded to know who gave the drafters of the
Constitution the right to say "we, the people" instead of "we the states." He and
George Mason led the fight against ratification at the state convention of Virginia.
On June 25, 1788, by a margin of only 10 votes out of 168 delegates, Virginia
ratified.
" Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES app. D, at 141 (S. Tucker ed. 1803). On the occasion of lectures

given at the College of William and Mary, Tucker argued that the member states
of the United States could still exercise sovereign powers to an unlimited extent.
Id. 187.
1 8 F. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.S.C. 1823). This case arose after the Act of

Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 repealed the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat

90 and reinstated the original Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, as

amended Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333. The repeal meant that the
justices of the Supreme Court were required to return to circuit riding. They served
on two courts, the circuit court, essentially a nisi prius court, and the Supreme
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authorizing the seizure and imprisonment of free Negroes brought into
the state on board any foreign or domestic vessel."3 Relying upon the
commerce clause of the Constitution, Mr. Justice Johnson held the law
unconstitutional.'
In arguing that the state law should be upheld, counsel for the defendant reasoned that "South Carolina was a sovereign state when she
adopted the constitution; a sovereign state cannot surrender a right of
vital importance; South Carolina, therefore, either did not surrender this
right or still possesses the power to resume it, and whether it is necessary ...to resume it, she is herself the sovereign judge."' 5 In effect, the
defendant was contending that the federal government could not affect
the rights of individuals within a member state of the union without that
state's consent.
Mr. Justice Johnson rejected this argument, declaring that it would
lead to dissolution of the union and was a direct attack upon the sovereignty
of the United States. 6 He also declared that the plaintiff had a right
under the laws and treaties of the United States to come into the port of
Charleston in the capacity of a seaman.' 7 This right was held to be
self-executing and to apply directly to individuals; the right, therefore.
could be vindicated in the state courts of South Carolina.' 8
B. The European Experience
In the early years of the European Common Market, it was not clear
Court, essentially an appellate court. Elkison came before Mr. Justice Johnson in
his capacity as a judge of the Southern Circuit Court (comprising the districts of
South Carolina and Georgia). See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss
OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-55, 69-77, 86-89, 96-102, 219 (1928) ; H. M. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 42-47, 79-80 (1953);
Mann, The MarshallCourt: Nationalizationof PrivateRights and PersonalLiberty
from the Authority of the Commerce Clause, 38 IIn. L.J. 117, 120, 131-49 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Mann].
" The law, entitled An Act for the Better Regulation and Government of Free
Negroes and Persons of Color, and for other purposes, Law of Dec. 21, 1822, no.
2277, 6 S.C. Stat. 179 (1839), grew out of fear on the part of white residents of
slave uprisings. See H. APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 268 (1943) ;
J. CA-R-ROLL, SLAVE INSURRECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800-1865, at 12
(1938).
" 8 F. Cas. at 495.
15Id. at 494.
16
Id.
By laws and treaties of the United States, the court evidently
' Id. at 495.
was referring to the commerce clause of the Constitution and to the 1815 commercial
convention with Great Britain. Id. at 495-96.
8
Itwas held that plaintiff had an action for trespass in the state court. Id. at
496.
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whether the Community Treaty contained self-executing provisions.10
The Court of Justice resolved this question in 1963 in N.V. Algemene
Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands

Fiscal Administration.20 The issue was whether Article 12 of the EEC
Treaty 2 - a provision that by its language was expressly binding only
on member states-created individual rights that member states could not
refuse. Three governments, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
submitted comments arguing that an individual could not acquire from
Article 12 a right that he could assert in a national court. Similarly, the
Advocate General of the Court presented his conclusion that Article 12
of the treaty was binding only upon member states." Nevertheless, the
Court held that the Community Treaty contains provisions "having a direct
effect and giving rise to individual rights which the national courts must
vindicate. '2 3 The Court further held that the Community constitutes a
new legal order whose subjects are not only the member states but their
nationals as well.24
The Van Gend decision was a milestone because it not only finally
resolved the question of whether the Community Treaty created rights
directly affecting individuals but also because it represented a quantum
increase in the judicial power of the Community. The clear import of
10 See, e.g., Stein & Hay, Legal Remedies of Enterprisesin the European Economic Community, 9 Am. J. Coip. L. 375, 400-03 (1960).
" 9 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 1 (Cour de Justice des Communaut~s
europ&nnes 1963).
1Article 12 prohibits member states from introducing, as between themselves,
any new or increased customs duties on importation or exportation. In Van Gend,
a Dutch importer of chemicals manufactured in Germany sued in a Dutch court
to recover customs duties imposed by a Dutch law adopted after the EEC Treaty
went into effect. The question was referred to the Court of Justice under Article
17722of the EEC Treaty. Id.
Id.at 47.
8
Id. at 23-24.
2
1Id. at 23. There have been many excellent comments on the Van Gend case.
See Billow, Zur unmittelbaren Wirkung von Stillhalteverpflichtlungen im EWGVertrag, 1963 AusSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 162; Ehle,
Wirtschaftslenkung und Verfassungsrechtsschutz im Gemeinsamen Markt, 1963
AuSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DEs BETRIEBS-BERATERS 157; Gori, Una pietra milare
nell" affermazione del diritto europeo, 1963 Giur. Ital. IV, at 49; Hay, Federal Jurisdiction of the Common Market Court, 12 Am. J. Comp. L. 21 (1963); Riesenfeld &
Buxbaum, N.V. Algemene Transport-enExpeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos
c. Administration Fiscale Nierlandaise: A Pioneering Decision of the Court of
Ju~stice of the European Economic Communities, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 152 (1964);
Robert, Sur lune egalit6 de droits devant la C. e.e. des ressortissants des ttats
membres avec ces Atats eux-mnmes, 1963 Rec. Sirey Chron. 29; Rodi6re, L'art.
177 du Traitg de Role, 1964 Foro Ital. V, at 1, 4; Sasse, The Common Market:
Between International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695 (1966) ; Stein, supra
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the decision is that with respect to the Community Treaty the traditional
approach, whereby each treaty partner has the power to determine for
itself the effect of a treaty on its nationals, is no longer valid.25 Henceforth this power is to be exercised by the Court of Justice.
The Court has recognized, however, that not every treaty provision
is self-executing; the issue must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 26 In
Liitticke v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis27 the Court faced a new aspect of

the problem of self-execution. The Van Gend decision had held only
that a standstill treaty provision, a provision requiring no affirmative
action by member states, can be self-executing. Litticke involved the
question of whether a provision of the treaty requiring affirmative action
by member states can be self-executing. The provision in question was
Article 95(3), which requires member states to abolish by the beginning of the second stage all internal charges on products from other
member states in excess of those applied on similar domestic products.
The plaintiff was challenging a compensatory turnover tax collected
under German law on goods imported from Luxemburg. The Court held
that Article 95(3) could be enforced by individuals in national courts. 2s
The concept of Community law as a new legal order operating directly
on individuals has been firmly established by the Van Gend-Liitticke line
of decisions. Consequently, the "great and radical vice" delineated by
note 5, at 496-99; Amphoux, Note, 1964 Rev. Gen. de Droit Int. Pub. 1; Br~ban,
Note, 1963 Rec. Dalloz 623; Durante, Note, 1963 Rivista di diritto internazionale
415; Ehle, Note, 1963 Neue juristische Wochenschrift 974; Jeantet, Observations,
1963 Jurisclas. Per. II, at 13177; Rigaux, Observations, 1963 J. des Tribunaux 190;
Ronzitti, 1964 Foro Ital. IV, at 98; Rousseau, Note, 1963 Rev. Gen. de Droit Int.
Pub. 421; "Sk.", Comment, 11 Soc. Ec. Wet. 227 (1963).
"See P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PATTERNS
FOR NEW LEGAL STRUCTURES 163-64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as P. HAY].
2The

Court recognized the self-executory nature of Articles 93(3), 53 and

37(2) but not of Articles 102, 93(1), 93(2), or 37(1) in Costa v. E.N.E.L., 10
Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 1143 (Cour de Justice des Communaut~s
europ~ennes 1964). In Albatros v. S.O.P.E.C.O., 11 Recueil de la Jurisprudence
de la Cour 1 (Cour de Justice des Communaut~s europ6ennes 1965), the Court
recognized that Articles 31(1) and 32(1) are self-executing but not articles
32(2), 33 or 37(3). See Sasse, supra note 24, at 698; Amphoux, Note 1965
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPAEN 59.

"'12 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 293 (Cour de Justice des Communaut~s europ~ennes 1966).

" Id. at 302. For comment on the Litticke case see Hay, Supremacy of Cominunity Law in National Courts, 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 524 (1968); Sasse, supra
note 24, at 699-700; Ulmer, Das Verbot der ateuerlichen Diskriminierung von
Einfuhrwaren in Artikel 95 des EWG-Vertrages, und seine Auswirkung auf
das nationale Abgabenrecht, 1966 AusSENWITSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBSBERlATERS 277; Waelbroeck, The Application of the EEC Law by National Courts,
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Hamilton is no longer a threat to the evolution of the European Community into a federalistic structure. At the same time, the Court of
Justice has successfully overcome a crisis of constitutional dimensions
and firmly asserted its power. 9
III. THE SUPREMACY OF COMMUNITY LAW
A. The American Experience
No federal form of government can succeed unless it is well established
that federal legal norms prevail over inconsistent member-state legal
norms with respect to issues within the sphere of federal competence.
The drafters of the United States Constitution were well aware of this
axiom and inserted a supremacy clause ° to assure the supremacy of federal law. This clause, however, was not of itself capable of assuring the
supremacy of federal law; the national government was too weak for its
legislative enactments and executive regulations to bind the much stronger
governments of its member states. The task of establishing the supremacy
of federal law was largely the work of the Supreme Court of the United
States under Chief Justice John Marshall. The vehicle used was not
only the supremacy clause but also the commerce clause8 ' of the United
States Constitution.
The supremacy issue was squarely faced by the Marshall Court in
Gibbons v. Ogden.2 This litigation arose out of exclusive franchises
19 STAN. L. REv. 1248, 1269-72 (1967); Wendt, Ungekkirte Fragen irn Streit

un die Uinsatzausgleichsteuer, 1967 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBSBERATERS 348; Ipsen, Note, 1966 EUROPARECHT 352; Mailander, Note, 4 Comm.
MxT. L. REv. 327 (1967); Waelbroeck, Note, 1967 CAHIERS DE DROiT EUROPfEN
180.
" There is another aspect of the problem of self-execution that has not been
discussed in this article: the question of whether directives of the Council of Ministers of the EEC give rise to individual rights enforceable in national courts. This
question has been much debated. See P. HAY, supra note 25, at 152-53; Desmedt,
Les Deux directives du Conseil de la Cee concernant la police des 6trangers, 1966
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPIEN 55; Dumon, L'afflux europ~en dans les droits et les
institutions des l*tats membres des Communauts europ~ennes, 1965 CAlIERS DE
DROIT EUROPLEN 10; Fuss, Rechtsschutz gegen deutsche Hoheitsakte zur Ausfidhrung des Europiiischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 1966 NEUE JURISTISCE WOCHENscHRIFT 1782; Waelbroeck, Application of EEC Law by National Courts, 19 STAN.
L. REv.
1248, 1272-75 (1967).
30
U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
, Id. art. I, § 8.
3222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). For comment on this decision see 1 W.
CROSSKEY,

POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED

STATES 250-80 (1953); F. FRA KFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 11-45 (19a7);
T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49-
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granted Colonel Aaron Ogden by the legislatures of New York and New
Jersey to operate steamboats between Elizabethtown Point, New Jersey,
and points on Staten and Manhattan Islands. Thomas Gibbons operated
his two steamboats in competition with Ogden without legal authorization from either New York or New Jersey. Colonel Ogden filed a bill
in chancery in New York asking for a permanent injunction and other
relief against the operation of the steamboats by Gibbons. In his answer
to the bill, Gibbons stated that he had a right to navigate the nation's
public waters by virtue of a license granted to him under an act of
Congress. 3 Chancellor Kent granted the permanent injunction.34 In his
view the nation and its member states were separate, independent governmental entities. He regarded the license granted by Congress as being
subject to the laws of the member states; thus there was no collision
between the act of Congress and the acts of the states creating the steamboat monopoly. 5
Chancellor Kent's decision was affirmed on appeal by the New York
Court of Errors," and Gibbons then appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States. 1 In the Supreme Court, the supremacy issue was
argued by counsel in the context of whether the national government had
exclusive or concurrent power to regulate commerce under the commerce
clause. Daniel Webster and William Wirt,3" arguing for Gibbons, contended that the power to regulate commerce resides exclusively in the
national government and that, since this power is exclusive, the states
are without competence to legislate in this area.39 In the alternative, they
argued that even if the power to regulate commerce is concurrently vested
in the national government and the states, rights claimed under state law
53 (1956); F. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 20-52
(1937); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 587632 (rev. ed. 1937) ; Mann, supra note 12, at 173-238.

88Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305.
This law was passed by Congress to
encourage coastal trade by American-owned ships.
" Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150 (N.Y. Ch. Ct. 1819).
8 Id. at 158-59.

8 Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1820).

For interesting accounts of the background of the appeal, see Kendall, Mr.
Gibbons and Colonel Ogden, 26

MIcH.

S.B.J. 22 (1947) and Mann, supra note

12, at 182-87.
" Webster had appeared before the Supreme Court in many landmark cases:
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) ; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). Wirt was a noted attorney who had opposed Webster in the
Dartntwuth College case.
"'Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1824).
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must be inoperative when they interfere with rights claimed under
national law. They argued that in such a case the national law must
40
prevail.
Counsel for Ogden, on the other hand, argued that Congress's constitutional power to regulate commerce is not exclusive because it was not
made exclusive in express terms.41 Moreover, their concept of concurrent power avoided the supremacy issue. They contended that state
powers as complete as those of any other nation-state continued to exist
after the adoption of the Constitution and that by ratifying the Constitution the member states had transferred none of their power over commerce to the national government.4 2
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.4 Stating
that the power of the national government over commerce is not limited
by the existence of the states but that it is limited only by the Constitution,44 he rejected the concept of state sovereignty advanced by counsel
for Ogden. Marshall also refused to adopt Webster's thesis of exclusive
power as a basis for the invalidation of state power. Instead, he held
it irrevelant whether the New York franchise was granted by virtue of
a concurrent power to regulate commerce or by virtue of a power "to
regulate . . . domestic trade and police" 4 and viewed the issue as one

of supremacy of national law over state law.
In argument... it has been contended, that if a law passed by a State,
in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes into conflict with
a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the constitution, they affect
the subject, and each other, like equal opposing powers.
But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and
provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of
the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act, inconsistent
with the constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of
the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to
such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers,
but, though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers,
interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pur40 Id. at 27.
"IId.at 35.
42 Id. at 35-36, 105-07.

" Id. at 186-222. A concurring opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Johnson. Id. at
222-40.
Id. at 196-97.
" Id. at 210.
4"
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suance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of
the United States. In every such case, the act of Congress, or the
treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.48
In positing unequivocally the principle that the national legal order is
supreme over the legal orders of the states in areas where both are
competent to act, Marshall was stating that the Constitution had created
a nation with powers independent of and not limited by the existence of
the member states. Beyond this, he established that it is the function of
the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts between the respective powers
of the national government and the states.
B. The Supremacy Problem in the EEC
Unlike the United States Constitution, the EEC Treaty contains no
supremacy or other clause that may be construed to expressly resolve
conflicts between the legal orders of the Community and its member states.
Nevertheless, in Costa v. E.N.E.L.,4" a case of the magnitude of Gibbons
v. Ogden, the Court of justice declared the absolute supremacy of Community law.4 Although strikingly similar in result to Gibbons, the Costa
case arose from an entirely different milieu.
Before Costa, there was much discussion as to whether Community
law took precedence over the national law of member states.49 Scholars
"Id. at 210-11.
• 10 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 1143 (Cour de justice des Communaut~s europ~ennes 1964).
" The Costa decision has inspired much comment. See P. HAY, supra note 25,
at 165-75; Constantinesco, La spicificitM du droit communautaire, 1966 REvUE
TRIMESTRIPLLE DE DROIT EUROPtEN 1; Frowein, Zum Verhdltis zwischen dem
EWG-Recht und nationalen;Recht aus der Sicht des Gerichtshofes der europiiischen
Gemeinschaften, 1964 AuSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 233;
Gori, La preminenza del diritto della Communita Europea sul diritto delgi stati
inembri, 1964 Guir. Ital. I. 1073; Hay, Supremacy of Cominunity Law in National
Courts, supra note 7, at 543-44; Sasse, supra note 24, Stein, supra note 5; Waelbroeck, The Application of EEC Law by National Courts, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1248,
1263-65 (1967); Virole, Note, 1965 REVUE TRIMESTRIPLLE DE DROIT EUROPtE
369.
" See L. ERADES &W. GOULD, THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS AND IN THE UNITED STATES

(1961);

Cahier, Le droit interne des organisations internationales, 1963- REv. GEN. DE
DROIT INT. PUB. 563; Catalano, Portatadell' art. 11 della Constituzione in relazione
ai Trattati istitutivi della Communitil Europea, 1964 Foro Ital. I. 465; Hayoit de
Termicourt, Le Conflit 'Trait6-Loi interne,' 78 J. DES TRIB NAux 481 (1963);
Ipsen, The Relationship Between the Law of the European Communities and National Law, 2 Comm. MKT. L. REv. 379 (1965) ; Ipsen & Nicholaysen, Europiiischen
Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1964 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOcHENSc
s Hi
339, 342; Ophfils,
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took part in a great debate over the nature of the relationship between
Community and national law. One group of writers believed that the
relationship could only be determined by referring to the practice in each
member state regarding treaty-national law supremacy. Upon examining
national practice, it was generally concluded that at the time of the Costa
decision the supremacy of Community law was not in doubt in the
Netherlands and in Luxemburg' but was in doubt in Italy and Germany,
and perhaps also in France and Belgium.51
A second group of writers argued that the member states had, upon
ratifying the treaty, transferred their sovereign rights in certain areas to
a new legal entity-the Community-and, therefore, that they were wholly
Quellen und Aufbau des europdischen Genteinschaftsrechts,1963 NEUn JURIsTIScHE
1697; Pescatore, L'autorit, en droit interne, des trait~s internationaux selon la jurisprudenceluxentbourgeoise,18 PASICRlSIE LUXEMBOURGEOISE
99 (1962); Piola-Caselli, Verhiiltnis des EWG-Vertrages zurn nationalen Recht,
1964 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERs 219; Schlochauer, Das
Verhiiltnis des Rechts der EuropiiischenWirtschaftsgemeinschaft zu del nationalen
Rechtsordnung der Mitgliedstaaten, 11 AicnIv DES VOLKERRECMTS 1 (1963); Van
Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and International Law, 58 Am. J. INT'L
L. 88 (1964) ; Waelbroeck, Belgian Judge Before the Internationaland Community
Law, 1965 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 348; Wohlfarth, Anfiinge einer
europiiischen Rechtsordnung und ihr Verhdltnis sum deutschen Recht, 1962
JURISTEN-JAHRBUcii 241; Zweigert, Das Verhdltnis des Rechts der europiiischen
Gemeinschaften sum nationalen Recht, 29 BEIHEFT ZUR ZEITSCIERIFT FUR DAS
GESAmTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1 (1965); Zweigert, Der Einfluss des europiiischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Rechtsordmng der MitgliedWOCHENSCHRRIFT

staaten, 28
VATRECHT

RABELS ZEITscHRIFT FUR AuSIXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRI-

601 (1964).

'0 Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, 10 Receuil de la Jurisprudence

de la Cour 1177. See Pescatore, supra note 49; Van Panhuys, supra note 49.
8" Italy and Germany are unique among the Six in possessing constitutional courts
with the power to pass on the constitutionality of national treaties. See CONST. OF
ITALY, art. 134 (1948); BASIc LAW OF GER. FED. REP., art. 100 (1949). Regarding
German law on this point see Judgment of March 20, 1963, 15 BVerfG 337;
regarding Italy see Judgment of Dec. 27, 1965, [1966] Foro. Ital. I, 8. Moreover,
both countries require a "transformation" of a treaty into a national legal order
by the passage of a statute so that it was at best doubtful whether subsequent national
legislation could take precedence over an existing treaty. C. FABOZZI, L'ATTUAZIONE
DEI TRATTATI INTERNAZIONALI MIEDIANTE ORDINE DI ESECUZIONE 162-64 (1961);
Sasse, supra note 24, at 724-25. Although article 55 of the French Constitution
specifically states that international treaties are absolutely superior to national law,
some writers doubted that French courts would feel empowered to ignore a statute
contrary to a treaty. La Grange, La primaut6 du droit communautaire sur le droit

national, 1964 SEMAINE DE BRUGES, DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT NATIONAL 21,
41; Waelbroeck, supra note 48, at 1260. The status of the Community Treaty was
in doubt in Belgium for similar reasons. In a rccent decision, however, the treaty

was considered absolutely supreme to national law. Judgment of June 9, 1966,
[1966] Pasicrisie belge III, 120; 5
Brussels).

COMM. MKT.

L. REV. 326 (1967)

(Court of
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without competence to act in those areas in which power to act had been
transferred. These writers rejected the view that the supremacy problem
52
should be solved by reference to national practice.
Professor Zweigert, however, eschewed both groups and theorized
that the supremacy of Community law springs from the treaty itself. His
view was that it is implicit in the treaty that Community law must prevail
since Community law must have uniform application.5"
It was in this setting that the Court of Justice decided Costa, which
involved the issue of a direct conflict between a provision of the EEC
Treaty and a subsquent national law.54 By the time the case reached the
Court of Justice on referral from the Milan trial court, the Italian Constitutional Court had held in effect that the trial court must disregard a
treaty right if it conflicts with a subsequent national law.5 5 The Advocate
General of the Court of Justice believed that there was little the Court
could do to safeguard the principle of supremacy of Community law.
He argued that under the circumstances the Court of Justice must defer
to Italian practice regarding treaty-national law supremacy, and that Italy
should either amend its Constitution to make it compatible with the treaty
or denounce the treaty.5
The Court of Justice, however, refused to accept the Advocate General's views in this regard. Instead, the Court relied on a relinquishment
of sovereignty theory as the point of departure for recognizing the
absolute supremacy of Community law.
Unlike ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty established
its own legal order, which was incorporated into the legal systems of
" This view originated with Ophfils, supra note 49. See Ipsen, supra note 49;
Wohlfarth, supra note 49. See also P. HAY, supra note 25, at 184-85, for an argument against this theory.
"' Zweigert, Der E'nfluss des europiiischen Geneinschaftsrechts auf die Rechtsorduungen der Mitgliedstaaten,28 R.BELs ZmTscHiaIRr FfR AUSLXNDISCHES UND
INTERNAZIONALEs PRIVATRECHT 601, 638-40 (1964).
" For a precise account of how the case arose and how it came t) be referred
to the Court of Justice see Stein, supra note 5, at 493-96. See also Sasse, supra
note 24, at 700-04.
The treaty provision in question was article 37, which prohibits certain types
of state monopolies. The law in question was the Italian nationalization law of
1962, under which the private Milan electric power system was nationalized. Law
of Dec. 6, 1962, n. 1643, Gaz. uff n. 316, Dec. 12, 1962; Leggi e decreti 1962, n.
1643, at 5523.
" Decision of March 7, 1964, [1964] Foro Ital. I. 516; [1964] Guir. Ital. 1 465.
The trial court judge had referred the case to the Italian Constitutional Court,
as well as to the Court of Justice. See Stein, supra note 5, at 493-96.
" Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, 10 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de
la Cour 1180.
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the Member States at the time the Treaty came into force and to which
the courts of the Member States are bound. In fact, by establishing a
Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, personality and legal capacity, the ability to be represented on the international level and, particularly, real powers resulting from a limitation
of the jurisdiction of the States or from a transfer of their powers to
the Community, the States relinquished, albeit in limited areas, their
created a body of law applicable to their
sovereign rights and thus 57
nationals and to themselves.
The Court then found the actual basis for the supremacy of Community law in the EEC Treaty itself. It held that Article 189, under
which Community regulations are made binding and directly applicable
in each member state, would be meaningless if a member state could
unilaterally nullify them through subsequent legislation.5 8 As Professor
Stein has pointed out,59 the Court used a principle of implied power in
dealing with the Treaty that is similar to the method used by Chief Justice
Marshall in interpreting the United States Constitution in McCilloch v.
Maryland. °
That Community law takes precedence even over an inconsistent provision of a national constitution is implicit in the Court's decision. The
Court, in its relinquishment of sovereignty theory, assumes that the
Treaty, when it was adopted, did not contravene the existing constitutional
provisions of any member state;6- and the Court's unqualified statement
that no unilateral measure in conflict with the Treaty could validly be
enacted in a member state would seem to include subsequent constitutional
provisions adopted by member states.
The real importance of the Costa decision, however, goes beyond the
establishment of the principle of the absolute supremacy of Community
law. Even before Costa, there was near unanimous agreement that Community law should be considered supreme."2 What was distinctive was the
manner in which the Court established the supremacy principle. As
57 Id. at 1158-59, translated in 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
8023 at 7390.
"810 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour at 1159-60. This holding prompted
one commentator to call article 189 the "supremacy clause" of the EEC Treaty.
P. HAY, supra note 25, at 172.
"' Stein, supra note 5, at 511.

eo 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

" It was to be expeetel that the Court would not elaborate on this point. It has
ruled that it is not competent to interpret or apply national law or national constitutional provisions. Friedrich Stork & Co. v. High Authority, 5 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 48 (Cour de Justice des Communaut~s europ6ennes 1959).
"SSee authorities cited note 49 supra.
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Professor Stein has pointed out, the Court firmly asserted its own power
to determine the relationship between the Treaty and the national legal
order in each member state.6 3 National practice regarding treaty-national
law supremacy is not, therefore, relevant with respect to the Community Treaty. The thrust of the Costa decision is that the principle
of supremacy will apply not only in the Community Court but also in
the national courts of member states. So considered, the Costa decision is
remarkably similar to Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.
C. Pre-emption

The question of the pre-emption of national law by Community law
is intimately related to the supremacy issue. By assuming the responsibility for protecting the supremacy of Community law in Costa, the
Court of Justice, in addition, necessarily assumed the responsibility for
developing a doctrine of pre-emption for the Community.
In the United States it has long been recognized that it is the constitutional duty of the Supreme Court to decide, when presented with the
issue, whether it is necessary to invalidate a state law in order to preserve
federal supremacy." In carrying out this duty, the Supreme Court has
dealt with the issue of pre-emption in numerous cases.6 5
These cases reject a doctrine of strictly exclusive powers, such as
that propounded by Webster in Gibbons v. Ogden,66 that would block
out fixed spheres of state and federal responsibility. Broadly speaking,
the Court has taken the view that, except in those relatively few areas
in which exclusive power is granted to the federal government, the plan
of the Constitution is to permit the states to continue to act until the
federal government elects to intervene. Even where the federal government has acted, the Court has taken a weighing-of-interests approach in
deciding whether the state action should be permitted to stand. When
the federal interest in avoiding multiple and conflicting state regulation
Stein, supra note 5, at 513.
Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction,
12 STAN. L. Rnv. 208, 209-10 (1959). This duty is, of course, derived from the
supremacy clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
" The Court dealt with this issue very recently in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968). In this case the Oregon courts held that an East German next of kin
of an Oregon intestate could not take personalty because of an Oregon statute that
provided for escheat unless the non-resident alien claimant established that reciprocity was given to American citizens by the alien's government. The Supreme
Court barred the application of this statute on the ground that it conflicted with the
federal foreign relations power.
0" See p. 39 supra.
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is paramount, the Court will bar the application of the state statute;
when it is not, the statute will be upheld."7
Like the decision of the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 8 the
opinion of the Court of Justice in Costa left unanswered the question of
the pre-emptive effect of Community law. Recently, however, the Court
was faced squarely with this question in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,09

which approaches Van Gend and Costa in importance. In Wilhelm,
several German manufacturers of dyes had been fined by the German
Bundeskartellamt for violation of sections 1 and 38 of the German Law
against Restraints of Competition. The Commission of the EEC also
instituted a proceeding, charging a violation of article 85, the basic antitrust provision of the Treaty. The manufacturers, denying the existence
of any price-fixing agreement and claiming that the Bundeskartellamt
did not have the right to apply German law since a proceeding had already
been initiated by the EEC Commission, appealed the decision to the Kammergericht of Berlin. Pursuant to article 177, the Kammergericht asked
the Court of Justice to rule on the question of whether the member states
must refrain from applying national law protecting competition in a case
in which Community law may also be applicable.7"
The German manufacturers argued that the supremacy of Community
law requires article 85 to be applied erclusively to any fact situation to
which that article of the Treaty may apply. This argument resembles
Webster and Wirtes contention in Gibbons v. Ogden that exclusive power
to regulate commerce is vested in the United States.7 1 It is also similar
to the transfer of sovereignty doctrine72 that by granting sovereign powers
to Community institutions in certain areas, the member states necessarily
deprived themselves of all powers to act in those areas.
Three intervening governments, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, disputed the manufacturers' argument. They argued that with
" This broad generalization, of course, hides many of the nuances of the preemption problem in the United States. For complete discussions of the problem see
Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146
(1965); Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLum. L. REv. 561 (1954);
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. Rav. 489
(1954); Schwarzer, Enforcing Federal Supremacy: Relief Against FederalState Regulatory Conflicts, 43 CALiF. L. Rav. 234 (1955); Note, Pre-emption as a
PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction,12 STAir. L. Rav. 208 (1959).
"Sce pp. 40-41 supra.
"2 CCH Comm. MxT. REP. 8056 (Feb. 13, 1969).
70
Id. 8056 at 7868-69.
7 See p. 39 supra.
7 See pp. 42-43 supra.
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respect to the various legal schemes enacted to protect competition the
principle of co-existence and parallel application of Community and national law is embodied in the Treaty. Under this view, competition agreements are permissible only when they overcome the "double barrier" of
both Community and national law.
The EEC Commission submitted a third argument for consideration.
It agreed in principle with the double barrier theory, but recognized that
under certain circumstances a conflict could arise between Community and
national law. Such a clash could occur either when the Commission
permits a practice that is declared illegal under national law or when
the Commission prohibits a practice that is exempt under national law.
In either case action on the part of the national authorities would prevent the Commission from uniformly applying and enforcing Com7
munity law and would thus contravene article 5 of the EEC Treaty. "
The Commission took the position that in the event of a conflict,
the national authorities would be required to defer to Community law.
The opinion of the Court of Justice essentially upheld the position
of the Commission. It affirmed that the parallel application of national
law and Community law is permissible, thereby impliedly rejecting the
transfer of sovereignty theory. 74 Nevertheless, the Court recognized
that such parallel application of national and Community law is possible
only when it does not jeopardize the uniform application of the Community cartel rules. When national action conflicts with Community
action, national law must yield. The Court based its decision not only on
article 5 of the Treaty, but also on the principle of supremacy of Community law announced in Costa.75
The Court's view of the pre-emptive effect of Community law bears a
close resemblance to the doctrine of pre-emption in the United States.
With the exception of those powers that are expressly made exclusive in
the Treaty or the Constitution,7 both the Community Court and the
"Article 5 requires member states to take all measures to insure the carrying

out of the obligations of the Treaty and acts of the institutions of the Community.
"Advanced by Professor Ophfils, the transfer of sovereignty theory has been
criticized as being "absolutist." Note, Review of Literature, 1 Comm. MKT. L.
REv. 374, 377-78 (1963). Professor Hay believe.; that Ophills' approach confuses
the problem of identifying the substantive area appropriate for Community regulation with the problem of allocation of jurisdiction. P. HAY, supra,note 25, at 183-85.
"See pp. 43-44 supra.
" Like the United States Constitution, the Community Treaties, in certain instances, vest exclusive power in the Community. Article 65 of the European Coal
and Steel Community Treaty, for example, provides that price agreements between
coal and steel enterprises may be examined only with regard to Community Law.
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Supreme Court have rejected an exclusive power theory as the basis for
federal pre-emption. Moreover, both courts seem to use a balancing test
and will allow member-state actions to stand if the uniform application
and enforcement of the superior law is not jeopardized.

IV.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER:

JUDICIAL REVIEW
To assure the effectiveness and the implementation of either a federal
or a supranational legal order, some type of check must be maintained
over the legislative and administrative acts of both the federal or supranational entity and its member states. In the EEC, as well as in the
United States, much of the responsibility for such control has been
delegated to or assumed by the judiciary.
A.

The American Parallel

Most commentators use the term "judicial review" broadly to refer
to judicial power to disregard or strike down state or federal statutes
found to be unconstitutional. 7 The prevailing view among scholars is
that the doctrine was established in the United States in 1803 by Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison."8

One writer, Dean Frank R. Strong, has demonstrated, however,
that the term "judicial review" is in reality a multi-dimensional concept
of American administrative-constitutional law.70

Dean Strong asserts

that the concept embraces two distinct methods of protecting the individual from an undue exercise of governmental power. He draws a distinction between judicial consideration of legislative and executive action
through the processes of fact finding, statutory interpretation, and application of the intended governing rule to the specific facts, which he calls
ordinaryjudicial review, and judicial consideration of the constitutionality
of governmental acts, which he calls constitutionaljudicial review.80
M. HART & H. WECESLER, TnE FEDERAL COURTS AND TEE FEDERAL
(1953); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court:
Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169
(1968) ; Rostow, The Democratic Characterof JudicialReview, 66 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1952); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
77 E.g., H.
SYSTEm 7-27

HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).

" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
" Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of AdministrativeConstitutional Law (pts. I & II), 69 W. VA. L. REv. 111, 249 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Strong].
8
Od. 250-51.
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Constitutional judicial review, although hotly debated, has become
well established in the United States. Some writers have attempted to
demonstrate that the framers of the Constitution intended the judiciary
to have this power." Others have attempted to trace the doctrine to
English law.8 2 Regardless of its origin, the doctrine has been continually applied by the Supreme Court of the United States.'
Dean Strong distinguishes two types of constitutional judicial review,
direct and indirect, both having the identical objective of protecting the
individual from unwarranted government action. Direct constitutional
judicial review offers protection through a direct assertion that certain
acts of government have no legal validity.8 4 Indirect constitutional
judicial review, on the other hand, offers protection by assuring the dilution of government power through the distribution of that power between
the states and the federal government and among the three branches of
the federal government.8 5
Although of much broader application, ordinary judicial review"
has been widely used in the field of administrative law. In this area,
however, the federal courts of the United States have embraced several
legal rules that severely restrict its scope. First, they have limited their
power with respect to fact determinations through development of the
rule that the courts should defer to the expertise of administrative bodies
7
if the determinations of fact are supported by substantial evidence.s
11 Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of JudicialReview, 12 MIcH.
L. REv. 538 (1914); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw,
37 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
8
It has been asserted that Dr. Bonhan's Case, 8 Co. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646
(C.P. 1610), is the forerunner of judicial review. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and
JTudicial Review, 40 HAtv. L. REv. 30 (1926); Smith, Dr. Bonhan's Case and the
Modern Significance of Lord Coke's Influence, 41 WAsa. L. REv. 297 (1966).
8
The doctrine was recently applied in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969), and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Dean Strong
advances the interesting theory that constitutional judicial review was not established but merely begun by Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison. He states
that the establishment of the doctrine in the United States took most of the nineteenth century. Strong 120.
84 Strong 115.
8 Id. 112-14. This indirect limitation of governmental powers was exercised
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the
Supreme Court declared that President Truman's order seizing the steel industry's
production facilities could not be sustained because the President was not granted
this power under the Constitution. The Court held that this power could only be
exercised by Congress.
" Dean Strong finds the basis for this type of judicial review in the doctrine of
253-54.
separation-of-powers. Strong
87 This is the general federal rule. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
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Second, the Supreme Court on a number of occasions has held that
administrative interpretation of federal statutes, traditionally a question
of law, should be allowed to stand when there is found to be a "rational
basis" for the conclusions of the administrative body.8 8 Only in cases
involving the protection of a constitutional right is it clear that the
Supreme Court will go beyond these limiting doctrines.8 One leading
writer has concluded that the unmistakable trend in American law is
toward a narrowing of the scope of judicial review of administrative
action. This is in direct contrast with the French system where the trend
is toward a broadening of review 0°
B. The EEC Experience
As Professor Hay has pointed out, 1 there are principally two jurisdictional categories through which the Court of Justice is able to effect
constitutional control of a federal nature over the Community: (1)
appeals by member states, individuals and enterprises against legislative
and administrative acts of the Community (article 173) 92 and (2) cases
in which questions of Community law have been referred to the Court
of Justice by courts of member states (article 177). 93 Judicial review
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); K. DAvis,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT

§§ 29.01, 29.11

(1959).
88
E.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Pub-

lications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Rochester

Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939); Mississippi Valley Barge Line

Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934). Professor Davis finds the cases
on this point inconsistent. K. DAvis, supra note 87, at § 30.07.
So St' Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Cromwell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). Dean Strong
explains these decisions in terms of the distinction between ordinary judicial review

and constitutional judicial review. Strong 271. Others have explained them as
involving issues of constitutional or jurisdictional facts. W. GELLIORN AND C.
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 472-92 (1960); B. SCHWARTZ,
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD

229-31 (1954);

Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and JurisdictionalFact, 70 HARV. L. REV.
953 (1957). Many writers doubt the continuing validity of the Ben Avon Doctrine.
Dean Strong has defended it. Strong 82.
K. DAVIS, supra note 87, at § 29.11. atBut
" B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, 249.
91

P. HAY, supra note 25, at 109.

2

See generally G. BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
13847 (1962); P. HAY, supra note 25, at 110-20; D. G. VALENTINE, THE COURT
OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1965); Buergenthal, Appeals for
Annulment by Enterprises in the ECSC, 10 AM. J. CoMP. L. 227 (1961); Stein

& Hay, Legal Remedies of Enterprises in the European Economic Community, 9

Am. J. CoMP. L. 375 (1960).
" See generally G.

BEBR,

supra note 92; Chevallier, Le droit de la Comnunaut
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by the Court of Justice is exercised primarily. in actions falling into these
categories. Moreover, on the basis of these jurisdictional categories, the
Court of Justice has established its competence to exercise both constitutional judicial review and ordinary judicial review.
1. Constitutional Judicial Review
The EEC Treaty confers on Community institutions the power to
take both legislative and administrative or executive action, 4 and it establishes the power of the Court of Justice to declare that a legislative or
-administrative act is invalid. The Court may exercise this power under
article 173 and even, as Professor Hay has shown,9 5 under article 177.
The four grounds of appeal under article 173 of the EEC Treatylack of jurisdiction, violation of basic procedural rules, infringement of
the Treaty, and abuse of power-are modeled on French administrative
law.9" Under French law an administrative action can be challenged for
exc~s de pouvoir, that is, to prevent governmental agencies from exceeding
their powers.97 Court review of administrative acts on this ground is
ordinary judicial review since it involves examining the administrative
act against the legislative grant of authority.
However, the incorporation of this ground of appeal into the EEC
Treaty results in a fundamental change in the type of review exercised
by the Court. The issue on review is no longer limited to whether the
governmental act conforms to the legislative grant of authority; also at
issue is whether the governmental act conforms to the powers granted by
the Treaty-Constitution. The function of review in the latter case is to
gurop~enne et les fjuridictions francaises,78 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET LA SCIENCE
poLITIQuE 646 (1962) ; Ehle, Vorlage an den EuropaischenGerichtshof gemiss Art.
177 EWG-Vertrag, 16 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCIIENSCHRIrT 933 (1963); Irelan,

The European Court of Justice and the Struggle for Integration, 6 VA. J. INT'L L.
114 (1965); Martinez, The Nature and Functioning of Article 177 of the Rome
Treaty, 5 J. CoMm. MKT. STUDIES 113 (1966); Mashaw, Federal Issues in and
About the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 40
TUL. L. REV. 21, 32-56 (1965); Opsahl, National Courts and the Community
Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, in FEsTsIuRIF TIL FREDE CASTBERG

280 (1963) ; Pepy, L'article 177 du Traite de Rome et les juridictionsfrancaises,
52 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVY- 475, 475-501, 695-717 (1963);
Stein & Hay, supra note 92.

"'EEC Treaty, art. 189. See P. HAY, supra note 25, at 103-04. Regulations,
which have general effect in the Community, are legislative in character as distinguished from decisions, directives and recommendations.
" Hay, Supremacy of Community Law in National Courts, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L.
524, 535-38 (1968).
o Stein & Hay, supra note 92, at 383.
° B. ScHwArz, supranote 89, at 216-17.
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safeguard the allocation of governmental power among the Community
institutions themselves and between the Community and the member states.
Thus it serves to fractionalize the totality of power and to mitigate its
effect on the individual. Such essentially indirect constitutional judicial
review is analogous to the judicial act performed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in considering whether the President has usurped a
legislative power or whether Congress has attempted to exercise a power
belonging to the states."
Governmental acts of member states are also subject to indirect
constitutional judicial review by the Court of Justice. Professor Hay has
hown99 that this method of judicial review was exercised under article
0
177 in Costa v. E.N.E.L."'
In that case the Court was actually reviewing national law for its "constitutionality" under Community law. While
it lacked the power to declare the national law invalid, the Court was
protecting the Community legal order against the encroachment of a
governmental act by a member state.
2. Ordinary Judicial Review
Although article 177 can be and is used by the Court of Justice as
a vehicle for the exercise of constitutional judicial review, it is more
generally used for the purposes analogous to ordinary judicial review.
The main purpose of article 177, therefore, is to assure the effectiveness
and uniform application of Community law in national courts. Thus article
177 requires that a national court of last resort refer any question concerning the interpretation of the Treaty or the acts of Community institutions to the Court of Justice. Other national courts may, but are not
required, to make such a referral. The Community Court's power of
ordinary judicial review is, however, more limited than that of the
federal courts in the United States. The Community Court merely has
the power to interpret; it does not have the power under article 177 to
apply Community law to a specific case. 1 ' Nevertheless, the Court through
8

An example of the latter type of review in American law is Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which held that Congress had no authority under the
Constitution to prohibit the transportion in interstate commerce of goods manufactured in factories in which children under the age of fourteen were employed. This
decision was overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
9

Hay, supra note 95, at 535-36.

10 Recueil de la jurisprudence de la Cour 1143 (Cour de Justice des Communaut~s
europ~ennes 1964). See pp. 43-44 supra.
1
"' See Conclusions of Advocate General Roemer, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,
00

2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.

8056 at 7868-69 (Feb. 13, 1969).
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its powers under article 177 has prompted member states to give
effect to the Community legal order.'0
V.

CONCLUSION

In a relatively short period, the Court of Justice has developed doctrines of judicial power that to a remarkable degree parallel those developed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Many obstacles to
the exercise of federal judicial power by the Court of Justice have been
overcome. However, a serious difficulty remains: the inherent weaknessof
the article 177 referral procedure.
Article 177 was intended to assure judicial review of substantially
all cases arising in national courts involving the Community legal order.
Because of a faulty referral mechanism, however, the article has been
unable to provide such assurance. Neither the Court of Justice nor individual litigants have the power to compel a referral under article 177.
This power is, instead, vested in the national courts, and even courts of
last resort have in many instances refused to issue an order of referral. 03
A recent example of this problem is the decision by the French Conseil
d'Etat that regulation 19 of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, prohibiting certain domestic preferences in the cereals sector, was ineffective
in France because of a subsequent law governing tariff preferences for
Algerian wheat.' 4
This decision touched off sharp reaction and criticism from many
quarters. 05 The EEC Commission's reaction to the decision was ex1
See Hay, supra note 95, at 538-41.
'o' In fact, national courts of last resort have used extensively several doctrines
to severely limit their duty to refer questions of Community law to the Court of
Justice. One doctrine holds it unnecessary to refer a question of Community law
if the case can be decided on independent national law grounds. A referral is
also unnecessary if the question of Community law is acte clair or if the Court
of Justice has already ruled on the matter. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1967, [1967]
Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 465 (Cour de Cassation); Judgment of Dec. 12, 1966,

[1967]

AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST

DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS

67 (Verwaltungs-

gericht Frankfurt); See also Written Question 100/67, Journal Officiel No. 270,
Nov. 8, 1967, translated in 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 9200; P. HAY, supra note
25, at 134-35; Hay, supra note 95, at 531-35; Tallon & Kovar, The Application of
Community Law in France, 4 Comm. MKT. L. REV. 64 (1966).
10, Syndicat g~nral des fabricants de s~moules de France, 1968 Recueil DallozSirey 285 (Conseil d'Etat).
10. See Buxbaum, Article 177 of the Rome Treaty as a Federalizing Device, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1969); Hay, supra note 95, at 549-50; Constantinesco, Com-

ment, 3 EUROPARECHT 318 (1968) ; Ipsen, Comment, 3 EUROPARECHT 330 (1968) ;
Kovar Note, 57 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivL 527 (1968);
M.L. (La Grange), Note, 1968 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 286.
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pressed in response to a written question submitted by a member of the
European Parliament. The Commission stated that the decision was contrary to the principle of supremacy of Community law established by
Costa in that a subsequent national law was given effect over a Community
act intended to have binding effect. 10 6
This occasion was not the first on which the Commission has commented on the decisions of the French Conseil d'Etat. On November 8,
1967, the Commission called attention to other decisions of the Conseil
d'Etat in which a question of Community law was decided without invocation of the article 177 referral process. It concluded that, although
extreme caution should be exercised, article 16910 T of the Treaty, which
gives the Commission the right to institute proceedings against any member state that fails to fulfill its treaty obligations, is applicable where
the court of a member state violates its duty of referral under article
177.108
It is questionable, however, whether article 169 provides a satisfactory solution. Such a procedure could not function as does the certiorari procedure in the United States because the control of the litigation would be in the hands of the Commission, not in the hands of the
private parties involved. 0 9 This objection may not be as serious as it
first appears. Although desirable, it is not absolutely essential that private
parties have control of the litigation.
The primary purpose of the certiorari procedure in the United States
is not the vindication of private rights; it is designed more to resolve
conflicts of opinion that have arisen among lower courts and to decide
questions the resolution of which will have immediate importance far
beyond the particular facts and parties involved."' Similarly, the purWritten Question 28/68, Journal Official No. C71, July 17, 1968, translated
...
in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9246.
"'1Article 169 provides:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill any
of its obligations under this Treaty, it shall give a reasoned opinion on the
matter; the State concerned must be given the prior opportunity to submit its
comments.
If such State does not comply with the terms of such opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may refer the matter
to the Court of Justice.
"' Written Question 100/67, mupra note 103.
100 P. HAY, supra note 25, at 135-36.
110 Address of Chief Justice Vinson before American Bar Association, Sept. 7,
1949, quoted in R. STERN & E. GRnSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcTICE 150 (1962).

See also Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 452-54 (1959); Magnum
Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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pose of article 177 is not so much to vindicate private rights as to achieve
uniform application of Community law throughout the member nations.
Such purpose could be effectively fulfilled by the device of the Commission
occasioning referrals under article 169.
Moreover, an article 169 action by the Commission in an appropriate
case may be desirable in order to provide the Court of Justice with the
opportunity to interpret article 177. Such a proceeding may also give
national courts a greater incentive to comply with their obligation to make
a referral.
Of course, the best solution to the problem would be an amendment
of article 177 to give individual litigants the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Such a procedure could, as suggested
by several writers,"" be modeled on the certiorari procedure of the United
States Supreme Court, with such modifications as may be necessary in
the light of Community experience. This procedure might also be
adopted without recourse to Treaty amendment by using the gap-filling
procedure of article 235.112
""I Hay, supranote 95, at 551; Buxbaum, supra note 105, at 1056. See also Mok,
Should the "first paragraph" of art. 177 of the EEC Treaty be read as a separate
clause?, 5 Comm. MKT. L. Rnv. 458 (1968).

...
Article 235 provides:
Where action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the
course of operation of the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community, and where this Treaty has not provided for the necessary powers of
action, the Council shall, by unanimous decision, on a proposal from the
Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, take the appropriate
steps.

